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CASE DIGEST

This CASE DIGEST provides brief analyses of cases that represent current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply established legal principles to
new factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories and
references are given for further research.
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IMMIGRATION

MATERIALITY STANDARD FOR CONCEALMENT OR MISREPRESENTATION UNDER IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT § 1451(a) IS SUFFICIENT TO INFLUENCE AN IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SER-

VICE DECISION; THE TEST OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER UNDER §
1101(f)(6) DOES NOT REQUIRE A FINDING OF MATERIALITY FOR ANY
FALSE TESTIMONY-Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537 (1988)

The United States sought to denaturalize a naturalized citizen accused
of Nazi attrocities in Lithuania in 1941. The Government alleged that
the defendant had misrepresented the date and place of his birth, his
wartime occupation, and his wartime residence during his 1954 naturalization proceedings and that knowledge of these facts would have changed
the outcome of the proceedings. To change the individual's citizenship
status after the close of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) proceedings, the United States must prove the following: (1) the
misrepresentation or concealment of some fact; 2) the misrepresentation
or concealment must have been willful; 3) the fact must have been material; and 4) citizenship was gained as a result of the misrepresentation or
concealment. The pertinent sections of the Immigration and Nationality
Act are the concealment and misrepresentation clause of § 1451(a) and
the false testimony clause of § 1101(f)(6). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held for the United States with respect to
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§ 1451(a). The court applied the standard developed in Chaunt v.
United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960), which provided that the state must
prove by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence that the additional facts, if known, would have warranted a denial of citizenship or
would have triggered an investigation that would have led to the disclosure of facts warranting a denial of citizenship. The Third Circuit
further held that false testimony provided during a naturalization proceeding is deemed to be material under § 1101(f)(6), which requires a
finding of lack of moral character for such testimony. The United States
Supreme Court held: Reversed, the applicable standard is whether the
misrepresentation or concealment had a natural tendency to influence the
INS's decision that the applicant was qualified, provided that evidence of
such misrepresentation or concealment was clear, unequivocal, and
convincing.
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court held that the relevancy of
the information must be determined by the result that would have ensued from official knowledge of the misrepresented fact itself, not from
the actions resulting from official knowledge of any inconsistency in
facts. The Court also rejected the need for a finding of materiality with
respect to § 1101(Q)(6), holding that false testimony, whether material or
not, is sufficient to constitute a lack of good moral character warranting
denial of citizenship. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for a determination of the effect of the defendant's misrepresentation under § 1451(a) and for a determination of whether that misrepresentation constituted "false testimony" under § 1101(f)(6). Significance-The plurality's reformulation of the meaning and application of
the materiality clause establishes a clear standard for application to future cases: If the concealed or misrepresented facts, standing alone and
without additional investigation, would have warranted a denial of citizenship, then the denaturalization is proper.
THE BROAD SUBPOENA POWER OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE DOES NOT AUTHORIZE ISSUANCE OF A BLANKET
JOHN DOE SUBPOENA TO GATHER INFORMATION REGARDING UNIDENTIFIED ALIENS-Peters v. United States, 853 F.2d 692 (9th Cir.

1988).
Under an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) program
designed to prevent undocumented aliens from receiving subsidized housing, the INS sought to review the files of a federally subsidized labor
camp to determine which residents were illegal aliens. The camp manager refused the request. The INS then served her with a third-party
subpoena ordering her to testify in connection with an INS criminal in-
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vestigation into the unknown individuals residing at the camp. The INS
issued the subpoena pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), which provides that
a subpoena may issue if it "concerns any matter which is material and
relevant" to the enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The INS argued that this broad statutory language authorized the INS
to issue subpoenas similar to the power of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) to issue John Doe summonses under 26 U.S.C. § 7609(0. The
district court found that unlike 26 U.S.C. § 7609(f), § 1225(a) imposes
no special procedural safeguards for John Doe subpoenas. Prior to issuance, however, the INS had demonstrated a reasonable belief that the
camp residents were in violation of the law. Based on these findings, the
court enforced the subpoena. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held: Reversed, the INS does not have the authority under §
1225(a) to issue a blanket John Doe subpoena when the targets of the
investigation are unknown.
The Ninth Circuit held that § 1225(a) does not contain specific language authorizing the issuance of John Doe subpoenas. The court found
that the IRS authority to issue a John Doe summons is reflected in the
language of the tax laws; § 1225(a), however, does not contain the same
procedural safeguards or policy basis to warrant granting such a broad
power. Although the INS had presented evidence of reasonable suspicion
in the instant case, the court indicated that this power might be subject
to abuse by INS investigators. The broad investigatory power of administrative agencies, recognized in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632 (1950), does not alleviate the fact that the authority of an administrative agency to issue subpoenas for investigatory purposes is created solely by statute. Because the court decided that the statute did not
authorize the issuance of a John Doe subpoena, the court never reached
the question of whether such a subpoena is consistent with the fourth
amendment. Significance-John Doe subpoenas issued by administrative
agencies are invalid without statutory authority derived from specific
language. The authorization, safeguards, and policy underpinnings of
such subpoenas must indicate a Congressional intent that this power is
necessary to effectuate enforcement of the laws governing the agency.
II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

ROUTINE STRIP SEARCHES OF DETAINED JUVENILE ALIENS VIOLATE JUVENILES' FOURTH AMENDMENT

RIGHTS-Flores v. Meese, 681

F. Supp. 665 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
A class comprised of all past and future detainees of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) under the age of eighteen held within
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the INS's Western reserve challenged an INS policy subjecting them to a
strip or body cavity searches (1) after meeting with persons other than
their attorneys, or (2) at any other time without demonstrable cause.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and determined that
such routine strip searches violated the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court stated that the
severely intrusive nature of a strip search, compounded when its subjects
are children and not charged with a criminal offense, outweighed the
Government's interest in maintaining security at detention facilities. This
governmental security interest was limited because strip searches only
resulted in minimal recovery of weapons or contraband. The court held
that a strip search must be based on the objective reasonable suspicion
standard despite the large number of detained aliens. The lack of constitutional protections in the aliens' home countries does not limit their
fourth amendment rights. Significance-This is the first decision by a
federal district court extending fourth amendment guarantees to prevent
routine strip searches of juvenile aliens.
III.

ACT

OF STATE DOCTRINE

THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE DOES NOT BAR A COMPETITOR'S
ANTITRUST AND RACKETEERING ACTIONS AGAINST A COMPANY THAT
ALLEGEDLY SECURED A FOREIGN MILITARY PROCUREMENT CON-

TRACT BY BRIBING FOREIGN OFFICIALS-Environmental Tectonics v.

W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
Environmental Tectonics Corporation (ETC) filed suit against W.S.
Kirkpatrick, Inc. and others (collectively "Kirkpatrick") for violations of
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1962-68, the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c), and
the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act, 2C N.J.C.S. § 41-1 et seq. The
complaint alleged that Kirkpatrick influenced the award of a Nigerian
defense contract through bribery of Nigerian Government officials. The
district court refused to examine the motivation of the foreign government because it would either result in embarrassment to that government
or interfere with United States foreign policy. Citing the act of state doctrine, the court dismissed ETC's action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held: Reversed, Although ETC's suit would
prompt inquiry into the motivations of a foreign sovereign's acts, the suit
does not require a judgment on the validity or legality of the acts of that
sovereign. Thus, the suit was not precluded by the act of state doctrine as
defined in Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d
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Cir. 1979) and Williams v. Curtis-Wright,694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982).
Rejecting the broad application of the act of state doctrine under Clayco
Petroleum v. Occidental Petroleum, 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), the
court held that the "traditional justification for involving the doctrine [is
to avoid] a judicial determination of the legal validity of a state's act
within its own borders." Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1061.
ETC's suit, however, focused on Kirkpatrick's alleged violations of
United States domestic law and sought damages from Kirkpatrick, not
the Nigerian Government. The court determined that invoking the act of
state doctrine could not be justified absent demonstrable proof by Kirkpatrick that the decision posed a threat to United States foreign relations.
Significance-This case further illustrates the disagreement among the
circuits regarding the application of the act of state doctrine. The decision also requires the defendant to present concrete proof of adverse effects on United States foreign policy in order to utilize the act of state
doctrine in domestic lawsuits.

